How can countries build stable democracies

This has resulted in the conclusion that building democracy is very much about institutionalizing free and fair elections. However, the scholarly studies on building liberal democracy have stressed the possibility and importance of further developing electoral democracies, beyond the free and fair elections, including political rights and civil liberties. Robert Dahl has presented a well-known conceptualization of a democracy polyarchy. His definition of democracy may be seen as a midrange definition between a minimal and maximal definition of democracy.

Dahl has presented two dimensions of a democracy in contestation and participation. In his definition of democracy, eight important institutions are mentioned. These are freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections and institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.

To ensure the implementation of democracy in contestation and participation, it is argued that civil liberties are crucial. The scholarly discussion on definitions of democracy has come with studies on nondemocratic states.

The process of democracy building starts in a nondemocratic environment which may be of different natures such as one-party-states, military regimes, dynastic rule, theocratic rule, tyranny, oligarchy, absolutism, despotism and monarchy, etc.

The research on nondemocratic regimes has set out different types. At first, democracies stood in sharp contrast to the totalitarian type. The totalitarian regime was characterized as a regime-type enforcing state objectives and goals on society and citizens, by concentrating all power to the elite and by subordinating societal activities and people to the control of the regime.

In sharp contrast to a democracy, the totalitarian society was defined as an atomized society with very limited independent political, economic, social and judicial institutions due to the total control by the regime through the use of propaganda and terror [ 25 ].

To uphold total control, research has come to stress the importance of the implementation of an official ideology, single mass party, secret police, full control of communication, monopoly of coercive methods and a central control of the economy [ 26 ]. Another and more common nondemocratic regime has been the authoritarian regime. The authoritarian regime, compared to the totalitarian, has said to have a limited official ideology that dictates societal sectors and with a less powerful, violent and controlling police.

The authoritarian regime is also open for socioeconomic pluralism and to some degree political pluralism, although such pluralism is never allowed to become political influential and challenge the ruling political elites. It should, however, be stated that democracy-building is far easier to achieve in an authoritarian setting compared to a totalitarian one. This is due to the existing political institutions in an authoritarian society, the allowance of pluralism and political opposition and to the more limited use of state violence and terror compared to totalitarian systems.

The previous trends of democratic progress around the world, followed by recent pessimistic assessments of returning authoritarianism, have led to a redeveloped interest in how to build democracies worldwide.

There is a long tradition of studying how to protect and promote democracy. The main focus has been to identify the explanatory factors or driving engines that encourage countries to transition to democracy and in how to consolidate new democracies to become stabile and enduring. There has been a dominating focus on national factors for the transitions to democracy. The research on explanatory factors for building democracy grew out of an increasing number of studies on domestic actors and structures of the s and onward, focusing primarily on socioeconomic factors.

This approach was tied to developmental studies and was referred to as the modernization school or the modernization thesis. In the s, in the context of decolonization and new independent states, studies focused on how to establish political order and stability. The modernization perspective on political order was illustrated by the famous study by Lipset, Political Man [ 28 ]. Lipset argued that modernization, in terms of a high level of gross national product, was an important driving engine for building democracy.

By assessing democracies around the world, it was convincingly argued how high levels of modernized socioeconomic structures were related to democratic states.

In other words, states with economic modernization would become transitional democracies and, with further modernization, also become consolidated democracies. Over time, new studies began to explore a more complex picture of modernization and democratization by unfolding a more detailed understanding about what economic and social indicators could trigger democracy building.

These studies did not question the importance of modernization for political development, but pinpointed the economic and social structures that are needed to be developed to see democratization.

It was argued that democracy building was based on economic progress embedding improved infrastructure, higher levels of education, shared societal values and improved health, etc. The main point made was that modernization embedded social issues that became explanatory factors to democracy rather than just focusing on pure economic growth. States with economic growth could through political reforms to facilitate social structures that were beneficial for developing and consolidating democracy.

In more recent decades of research done on the modernization thesis, economic progress leading to improved technology and the flow of information and knowledge has become new emphasized indicators for building democracy. The IT revolution has empowered people to engage in societal issues and provided people the tools to hold politicians and governments accountable for their decisions and actions, although research also stresses how authoritarian regimes may use new technology to haunt down political oppositions [ 29 ].

In addition, modernization was said to also impact the domestic class-structures. For instance, Moore [ 30 ], in the classical study Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy — Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World , argued the importance of the result of the modernization in the changes of the class structure.

He stressed that modernization was not sufficient in deciding democratization, since such socioeconomic development with higher levels of gross domestic product GDP could also lead to authoritarian system. Modernization embedded more specific favorable factor for democratization in industrialization, urbanization, increased power to the middle class, decreased power to rural landlords and improved infrastructure, education and health care that all contributed to improved conditions for democracy.

It was further argued that industrialization also integrated the commercialized countryside with urban areas, building ties between the urban middle class and rural peasants. Many studies have stressed the importance of a growing middle class to build democracy by integrating the lower and upper classes of the society into collaboration and unity. Socioeconomic modernization provides an economic and political ambitious middle class of business people, professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants, managers, technicians and clerical and sales-workers.

However, some studies have pointed out that the working class is pro-democratic, whereas the middle class is less interested in political change and more interested in protecting its economic role as an antidemocratic force, while other studies have emphasized the alliances between the working class and the middle class to build democracy [ 31 ]. Democracy is less likely to emerge in less modernized, agrarian societies and the dominating body of studies have stated a correlation between higher gross domestic product GDP and a growing middle class as the the main pro-democratic forces.

A second set of domestic factors to democracy aside from socioeconomic modernization includes the political culture.

The perspective on political culture was developed in the s and onward and focused on issues of socialization and the political orientations in cognitive orientation referring to the knowledge of and beliefs about the political system , affective orientation feelings about the political system and evaluation orientation including commitment and support for political institutions and the values and judgements of system performances.

Their study analyzed the nature of the political culture that promoted and protected stable democracies and when political culture was defined as the aggregation of individual political attitudes. They argued that there existed three types of political cultures: the parochial, subject and participant culture. In the parochial culture, citizens were only indistinctly aware of the political system; second, in the subject culture, citizens saw themselves as subjects to political affairs rather than participants and third, in participant culture, citizens are participants of the system.

The above-mentioned study stressed a connection between stable democracy and participant culture, but added that the importance of elements of parochial and subject cultures. It was argued that in the participant political culture, citizens participated in political affairs and supported political affairs, as well as how the parochial and subject political dimensions made the participating citizens loyal to the existing political decisions and implementation procedures, and thereby, they were supportive to the existing democratic institutions.

It was further argued that a grave danger to democracy existed in too much of a subject culture because it could lead to an antidemocratic, authoritarian political system. Democracies embed an increasing tension between democratic values, which are highly supported, and the trust in existing democratic institutions, which is declining. It has been concluded that there is high confidence within established democracies regarding political objects in the political community and the regime principles, but less confidence and trust in regime performances, regime institutions and politicians.

The reasons behind such tension may be the identified existing decline in social trust and civic engagement, failure in regime performances and constitutional design or cultural factors rooted in modernization and changing norms and values.

Important studies on modernization and shifting norms and values have added insight about potential explanatory factors and challenges for democracy.

Inglehart [ 35 ] conducted the famous World Values Survey, assessing the patterns of political attitudes in states worldwide. From a comparative perspective and over a long period of time, this survey has analyzed political attitudes toward the political community, democracy as an ideal form of government and regime performance. This survey has identified a decreasing respect for political authorities—such as in, for example, the police and political parties—and such declining respects is explained in terms of shifts in cultural values among citizens promoted by globalization, cultural transformations and modernization.

The modernization process has fundamentally transformed the political and cultural system from being previously based on religious beliefs to political institutions, rational behavior and post-materialist values of maximizing individual well-being.

Such fundamental transformation of culture may explain the identified shifting support to important political objects of democracy. The scholarly interest in and study of the aggregated attitudes of citizens toward political objects has been related to research focused on the role of the civil society. The American democracy was dynamic, vital and stable due to the highly developed network of civil society across economic, social, cultural and religious organizations and associations.

These patterns of civil society constituted a platform or arena for societal activities between the outer bounds of government and the inner bounds of family ties and provided an interesting and important function for political life in democracies.

Such an approach questioned existing theories on socioeconomic factors and democratization and stressed the importance of civil society for institutional functionality, efficiency and democratic legitimacy. Democratic governance, it was argued, was based on the existence of a dynamic civil society of civic engagement, trust and reciprocity between citizens, which would foster improved political and administrative performances and legitimacy.

The growing bulk of studies over time on civil society and democracy has focused on the relationship between civil society and the state and has concluded a positive versus negative definition of a civil society. First, it has been argued that civil society may be a counter force to the state and, second, an arena or platform for civic education and participation [ 38 ].

The negative definition of a civil society refers to the counter force role a civil society may play in regulating and controlling the state and its performances. On the other hand, the positive definition of the civil society refers to the assisting function civil society can have in relation to the state by providing an additional societal arena where citizens can meet, articulate, aggregate and associate freely and become aware of political life.

A civil society may therefore contribute to ideas, expertise, norms and values and societal actions to alleviate the pressure on the state and to guide the state in new directions for policy-making. A civil society may therefore have different functions in a democracy and may be an essential part in a vital and consolidated democratic system.

A third and final set of identified domestic factors for democracy building—aside from socioeconomic factors and political culture—includes political institutions and the political role of domestic political elites and the masses. One of the first and most important studies about political institutions and democracy was written by Huntington: Political order in changing societies.

The focus on political institutions as pivotal to democracy stressed the danger of increased political and economic demands from societal forces and delayed political institutionalization.

It was argued that societal transformation led to increased societal demands on politics and how such demands had to be met by new institutional arrangements. Lack of institutionalization would jeopardize political order, as the political system would come under severe pressure and finally overload. Such institutional overload would provide grave danger to political order and lead to political illegitimacy and system collapse.

Building democracy was therefore argued to be a process of institutionalization, in the establishment of functional political parties, to ensure political participation. Political parties were essential for political order in that they provided instruments for attracting and representing interests and aggregating preferences. They were also tools for recruiting future politicians and institutionalizing elections by empowering political competitive alternatives and organizing the political agenda.

Research on political factors for democracy has also focused on the specific type of institutions that best favor democratic progress and stability. Studies have explored how to design or institutionally structure democracies in the best way to promote democracy and have assessed parliamentarism versus presidentialism.

Such focus has, to a high extent, been based on the scholarly contributions by Linz and his colleagues. In his study, The Perils of Presidentalism [ 40 ], Linz argued that presidentialism is less favorable than parliamentarism for promoting and protecting stable democracies. Such conclusion was based on four perils of presidentialism. First, he argued that the nature of presidential elections winner-take-all could result in a presidency based on support from a minority of the electorate and provide a legitimacy gap.

Second, he further argued that the fixed presidential terms and the many hindrances to change a president faces could be problematic for democratic vitality and change, especially when considering how the parliamentary system is more adjustable to changing conditions. But to have something to eat, you have to be assured that you can survive and live. If you give me development but you take my life, what is there?

But once peace has been restored, what are the next priorities: political stability, economic recovery, social reform? Are they distinct tasks, or do they go together? It is difficult to say that you should do this before you do that. But doing that without doing this will not be easy either. It will be very difficult one day to conduct reforms, and then the next day you have a coup. Propitious political conditions will help address the real problems of economic development, and this is the biggest challenge after having restored peace.

At the African Union, we invested much in preventing conflicts, which is very difficult, or in managing them. At least Africa, for a change, is being seen as addressing its own problems. But be careful. The biggest problem is not only peace. It is governance — political and economic governance. For putting into place institutions for economic governance, you need stability, not necessarily democracy.

Even in undemocratic countries, as long as stability is there, they can do business. But stability is also related to democracy. Stability, long-lasting stability, is based on democracy. In some countries, like Liberia, we have seen enormous advances at the political level. But progress in social areas seems more difficult.

What do you think of this issue? There is a general problem of empowering the people of Africa, giving a chance to the people of Africa to make a difference, including women.

Women have been purposely marginalized. Others have been marginalized, but women have been further marginalized. Initially, after independence, the thinking in Africa was that the state is there to do everything. But that is over. The people have understood that there is a limit to what the state can do, that real transformation can be made only by the people.

Women have been imprisoned in their countries. They are a huge reservoir of talent and imagination, and a force for peace. So releasing the energies of women in Africa will be a big part of the process of social enhancement and improvement. It goes inevitably to the root causes of the problem.

You mentioned them: poverty, and then governance. The little resources we have are not properly managed and governed. The real challenge to peace and stability is governance, political and economic governance, so that the people feel that the power is fairly shared and that the resources are also fairly shared. Skip to main content. Get the free mobile apps Get the latest news from us on our apps. Welcome to the United Nations. Toggle navigation Language:.

Africa Renewal. From Africa Renewal:. April African Union. Also in this issue. Cover Story. Young Africans put technology to new uses. Millennium Development Goals: time to step up. Because power-sharing systems guarantee all parties representation in government, they threaten to undermine the very mechanism through which elections can drive democratisation. Excessive inclusion is therefore just as bad for democracy as excessive competition.

The task facing those who draft or adapt state constitutions is thus to decide on the appropriate balance between competition and inclusion. Such balance must allow for sufficient accommodation that all parties feel they have a stake in the system, while also maintaining as much competition as possible in order to promote accountability. Unfortunately, there is no ideal constitutional template that can be deployed across the continent to achieve this goal. Different countries may require different degrees of inclusion in order to achieve political stability.

Given this, it is remarkable — and worrying — just how few African countries feature inclusive political mechanisms that prevent certain communities from losing out systematically. For example, very few states feature meaningful decentralisation. Constitutional change, such as the new political system introduced in Kenya in , is very much a step in the right direction.

It locates the country in a reasonable middle-ground between majoritarian competition and forced inclusion. Although the presidency continues to wield great power, the capacity of opposition parties to check the executive within the legislature has increased — at least in theory.

And while there is no provision to ensure representative government, many communities who feel excluded from power nationally have been able to wield it locally by their choice of senators and governors at county level. Devolution is no a panacea, however.

In countries such as Nigeria, the creation of sub-national governments led to heated contestation and often violence as different communities campaigned for the right to be given their own state. Similar tensions are likely to emerge in the run up to the next Kenyan general elections, especially if the Jubilee Alliance Party fails to build an effective political machine. Although Nigerian federalism may have exacerbated tensions at the local level, it has eased them at the national level.

That reduced the prospects for a second civil war, which is surely a trade-off worth making.